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The role of national legislatures in European integration has received much-needed attention 
in recent years. This interest is primarily explained by the rapid growth in the policy 
competence of the European Union (EU) and by the realization, in line with the 
deparliamentarization thesis outlined in this chapter, that parliamentary bodies were, both 
individually and collectively, becoming increasingly marginalized in the EU policy process. 
Hence both scholars and politicians began to consider ways of making national MPs more 
involved in the processing of EU matters. In a broad context parliaments are central 
institutions in European systems of government. They elect and control the government, 
approve legislation, and as the bodies responsible for amending the constitution hold the 
ultimate power in society. Yet such constitutional perspective is arguably increasingly 
divorced from reality. National parliaments are almost without exception portrayed in the 
literature as reactive institutions, casting rather modest influence on policy initiatives coming 
from the executive. 
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There is no doubt that the EU has gone through a period of rapid constitutional transformation 
since the mid-1980s, with a series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) leading to 
substantial transfers of power from the national level to the European level of policy-making. 
While scholars could still prior to the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992) claim that member 
states would not delegate powers to the Union in so-called ‘high politics’ areas, these 
arguments sound somewhat hollow now as the jurisdiction of the EU extends basically to all 
policy areas, ranging from funding cultural projects to the gradual development of common 
security and defence policies, so that ‘nearly every conceivable area of policy is now subject 
to shared national and EU competence’.1 With successive enlargements west (1973), south 
(1981, 1986), north (1995), and finally, east (2004) the geographic scope of the European 
project has also extended far beyond its original sphere.  
 
 
The total size of the EU budget (less than 1.2 per cent of total EU GNI) is admittedly small, 
but the redistributive capacity of the Union should not be underestimated, as its agricultural 
and regional policies have a profound impact on the farming sector and on the less wealthy 
areas of the Union. The EU deregulates exchange by removing various barriers to trade while 
simultaneously regulating trade by setting up common standards that apply across the Union. 
More importantly, the introduction of the single currency with independent monetary policy 
decided by the European Central Bank (ECB), together with the increasing coordination of 
national economic policies, means that the economic policies of member states are to a large 
extent tied to rules agreed at the European level. And, the decisions of the EU are enforceable 
by the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), with the binding supranational 
legislation setting increasing limits on what national governments can do.2  
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Despite the economic and political powers of the Union, its decision-making process is still 
strongly influenced – some would argue even dominated - by national governments. 
Amendments to the Treaty, the constitution of the Union, are subject to unanimous agreement 
by the member states, with the EU institutions having no formal role in IGCs. Most of the 
important policy decisions, such as agreements on the timetables of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the consecutive enlargements, decisions on key appointments 
(such as candidates for the Commission President, the President and board members of ECB), 
and setting the Union’s long-term employment and economic policy strategies are taken by 
heads of governments in the summits of the European Council, the real board of directors of 
the Union. Despite the extended application of the co-decision procedure, the Council remains 
still far ahead of the European Parliament (EP) in its legislative powers. The role of the 
Commission in initiating and implementing legislation is overseen by national governments, 
whose civil servants participate in the hundreds of committees and working groups that draft 
the EU’s legislative initiatives and oversee their eventual implementation. 
 
 
The importance of national governments in the EU policy process makes it essential to study 
the role of national legislatures within the European integration system. After all, the defining 
criterion of parliamentary democracy is that the government is accountable to the legislature 
and can be voted out of office by it. However, most of the literature on national parliaments 
frames national parliaments as the main victims of integration. The next section of this 
introductory chapter revisits this literature, and presents the main arguments which support 
the case for national legislatures losing out as European integration unfolds. The following 
section then examines how national parliaments have responded to this challenge, with the 
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next section explaining how national parliaments get involved in EU affairs. The final section 
then outlines the structure of the book.  
 
 
 
DEPARLIAMENTARIZATION – IS EUROPE TO BLAME? 
 
 
According to the so-called ‘deparliamentarization’ thesis, the development of European 
integration has led to an erosion of parliamentary control over executive office-holders. The 
argument about deparliamentarization is based both on constitutional rules and on the political 
dynamics of the EU policy process.3 Constitutionally, the issue is relatively straightforward. 
Powers which previously were under the jurisdiction of national legislatures have been shifted 
upwards to the European level -- by national governments and legislatures themselves, 
thereby signaling that the benefits accruing to member states from integration outweigh the 
losses to national parliamentary sovereignty. Amendments to the EU’s constitution are subject 
to unanimous agreement between the national governments. But, after the negotiations in the 
IGCs have been completed, these constitutional bargains are usually presented as ‘take-or-
leave-it’ packages to national parliaments, where the only options for domestic legislatures 
are to accept the constitutional bargains without amendment or to reject the packages and 
plunge the EU into constitutional crisis (as happened when the French and Dutch rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty in referenda in May and June 2005). Indeed, constitutional bargains 
between member state governments have only twice been rejected by national parliaments. In 
1954 the French National Assembly failed to ratify the plan for a European Defence 
Community (EDC), and in January 1986, the Danish Folketinget rejected the Single European 
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Act (SEA), only for the will of the parliamentary majority to be overturned by a consultative 
referendum held in February that year.      
 
 
Politically, in the control of European-level executive powers and in the adoption of 
legislative acts at the EU level, neither domestic parliaments nor the EP are sovereign bodies. 
The increased use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council makes it difficult for 
national parliaments to force governments to make detailed ex ante commitments before 
taking decisions at the European level. Also, despite its increased role in the EU political 
system, the powers and legitimacy of the EP fall far short of full compensation for the loss of 
power of national parliaments. And, even if the EP were to become a true co-legislator with 
the Council, a section of national MPs would not view this positively as such a move would 
reduce the powers of national governments in the Council. Moreover, through the centrality 
of technical expertise in the EU policy-process, the true winners of European integration have 
arguably been bureaucrats and organized private interests at all levels of government and not 
directly-elected parliamentarians — the traditional holders of legitimacy in European systems 
of parliamentary government.4  
 
 
Research on the impact of the EU on national politics has provided strong support for the 
deparliamentarization thesis. This research has usually approached the question under the 
theoretical framework of ‘Europeanization’, defined originally by Ladrech as ‘an incremental 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC (European 
Community) political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making’.5 Europeanization is hence primarily a top-down 
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concept, employed for analyzing the impact of integration on developments at the national 
level.6 Most of this burgeoning literature has focused on whether the EU alters the balance of 
power between domestic actors. The EU creates new exit, veto, and informational 
opportunities for domestic actors and therefore changes the national opportunity structure for 
exerting political influence. The idea is thus simple: states are not homogeneous, monolithic 
entities and the process of European integration may empower certain groups or institutions 
while reducing the power of others. 
 
 
Reviewing briefly this literature, we can identify two partially conflicting schools of thought. 
According to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach associated with Moravcsik, European 
integration strengthens domestic governments as they, and not backbench parliamentarians or 
people outside the executive branch, participate in decision-making in the various EU 
institutions. The main beneficiaries are the ministers in charge of most ‘Europeanized’ 
portfolios (notably prime ministers and finance ministers) and the civil servants within 
ministries responsible for EU matters. The key aspect behind this argument is information. 
National executives use the European institutions in a two-level game to strengthen their 
autonomy vis-à-vis other national actors, primarily the representative bodies. The dominant 
position of domestic governments in both national and European politics, combined with the 
constant interaction and policy co-ordination between the two levels, reduces the influence of 
parliaments at all stages of the decision-making process -- hence deparliamentarization.7  
 
 
According to the multi-level governance scenario, on the other hand, the EU policy process 
can also weaken the position of the government, as societal groups can bypass the national 
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government and use the new supranational channel for pursuing their policy objectives.8 
National executives are significant and probably the most important actors in EU decision-
making, but they are not gate-keepers preventing access from domestic groups to the 
European level. This tendency is facilitated by EU institutions, most notably the Commission 
and the EP, that have consistently sought to establish and consolidate links with both 
European and national non-governmental organizations. The introduction of structural funds 
has strengthened the regional level in several member states, with regional authorities, 
encouraged by the Commission, circumventing national authorities and establishing direct 
contacts with the EU bodies. Indeed, as indicated by the thousands of lobbyists working in 
Brussels, regions and national interest groups make active use of the ‘EU channel’ to achieve 
their policy objectives. Another aspect of multi-level politics is that the process of integration, 
and particularly the increasing interdependence of European and national agendas, will reduce 
the autonomy of all actors with national policy choices constrained by the existing EU rules 
and legislation and by what is politically feasible in light of the preferences of other member 
states and the EU institutions. Importantly, while the multi-level governance framework does 
not posit national governments the same weight as the intergovernmental approach, it does 
not view national legislatures as beneficiaries of the process either. If anything, their role 
becomes weaker in the multi-level political system where intergovernmental policy 
coordination and negotiations are the primary mode of governance.9  
 
 
Turning to the results of selected key cross-national research projects, the volume edited by 
Rometsch and Wessels uncovered certain similarities between the member states: the 
strengthening of the position of the prime minister; the central role of the governments 
coupled with decentralization and flexibility in decision-making; the bureaucratization of 
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public policy-making; high administrative coordination in national EU policy, and, 
significantly, low involvement of national parliaments.10 The follow-up volume edited by 
Wessels, Maurer and Mittag largely confirmed these findings. However, that study argued 
that national parliaments were now starting to be more involved in the EU policy process: ‘It 
can be concluded that in nearly all Member States, national parliaments have strengthened 
their formal role in the EU decision-making process. Though decision-making continues to be 
primarily in the hands of governments, their room for manoeuvre in Brussels negotiations will 
be restricted to an increasing extent by national parliaments and particularly by their 
specialized committees’.11 Despite such improvement, they concluded on a pessimistic note 
that ‘continuous deficits in parliaments’ ability to play the multi-level game reduce the 
influence of national deputies. The involvement of parliaments in the EU policy-cycle 
remains weak and largely reactive’.12 The volume edited by Kassim, Peters and Wright 
focused on national coordination of EU policy. Summing up the role of national parliaments 
in this policy coordination, Kassim observed that parliaments have ‘very little ability to 
scrutinize Union proposals, still less to influence their content, and are able only in very 
exceptional cases to direct the actions of their respective governments’.13 Country-specific 
accounts of Europeanization largely confirm the findings of these comparative projects.  
 
 
Furthermore, EU membership imposes severe constraints on the policy autonomy of the 
member states and their parliaments. Apart from EU directives that require national 
transposition, an increasing share of domestic legislation originates in the European Union 
institutions, increasingly in recent years in the form of policy diffusion and peer pressure 
under the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and other ‘soft law’ coordination efforts. 
However, it must be at the same time emphasized that the prediction made by the 
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Commission President Jacques Delors in the late 1980s about the share of legislation that 
would flow from Brussels has proven to be quite misplaced.14 Research has shown this share 
to be much lower, even when including domestic laws that were in some way ‘inspired’ by 
the EU. For example, Töller demonstrates that while the share of EU-inspired legislation 
enacted by the Bundestag has doubled since the mid-1980s, between 1998 and 2002 34.5 per 
cent of laws approved by the Bundestag’s were related to the European Union.15 According to 
Hegeland only 6 per cent of the legislation adopted by the Swedish Riksdag between 1995 
and 2004 contained a reference to an EU law.16 Johannesson in turn showed that between 
1998 and 2003 20 per cent of Riksdag’s legislation was related to binding EU legislation, with 
an additional 10 per cent in some way related to the Union.17 In Finland between 1995 and 
2003 12 per cent of the laws enacted by the Eduskunta contained a reference to an EU law.18 
The most likely explanation for this relatively low share of EU-related domestic laws is that 
most of the legislation adopted by national parliaments deals with policy sectors where the 
EU has no formal competence to enact its own laws.  
 
 
This brief overview of recent literature on the Europeanization of political systems shows that 
the evidence is quite heavily stacked in favour of the executive branch. The executive has 
strengthened its position, with particularly the status and visibility of the prime minister 
reinforced through the summits of the European Council and through her leading role in the 
coordination of national EU policy. The sectorization of EU decision-making puts a premium 
on policy-specific technical expertise, and this coupled with the (alleged) rise of regulatory or 
managerial style of politics and delegation of authority to various agencies arguably 
empowers civil servants at the expense of democratically elected office-holders.19 In addition, 
integration imposes on national parliaments a political environment where not only have the 
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legislatures lost out constitutionally, with power delegated upwards to European institutions, 
but also politically, as member states are involved in a political system where policies which 
strongly diverge from the status quo are to an increasing extent in most policy areas no longer 
feasible.       
 
 
From the point of view of national legislatures, the conventional wisdom thus paints a rather 
bleak picture. However, to what extent is this alleged deparliamentarization a result of 
European integration? Comparative studies of parliaments have sought to categorize 
legislatures with respect to their powers and overall standing in the political system. Since 
legislatures and national political systems vary quite significantly, the resulting typologies 
have been rather crude, serving more as indicators of influence than as exact approximations 
of their powers. Furthermore, the operationalization of parliaments’ influence is highly 
problematic, as quantitative indicators, such as the ability of the legislature to get its 
amendments accepted or the use of parliamentary questions, tell us rather little and such 
activity can in fact also be interpreted as a sign of institutional weakness. Stronger legislatures 
do not often have to rely on such measures, as they can influence the content of the bills 
already before they are introduced in the parliament. Such anticipatory behaviour is arguably 
particularly pronounced in countries with minority or minimum winning coalition cabinets. 
 
 
Two comparative analyses from the 1970s merit our attention here. Blondel measured power 
as ‘viscosity’ — meaning the ability of the chamber to influence initiatives emanating from 
the executive.20 In a more developed model, Mezey proposed two yardsticks: the ability of 
the legislature to modify and veto policy proposals, or to even balance or substitute the 
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executive’s agenda with that of its own; and the support enjoyed by the parliaments among 
the elites and the public, with the latter particularly relevant for the long-term stability of the 
legislature.21 These analyses, based mainly on evaluations from the 1960s and 1970s, 
classified the European legislatures as casting, all things considered, rather modest influence 
on policy-making. Legislatures were portrayed as reactive rather than active, with their 
primary function being that of approving – and perhaps amending -- initiatives coming from 
the executive. 
 
 
More recent comparative projects have largely arrived at a similar conclusion. There appears 
to have also been relatively little change in the overall influence of the parliaments over the 
decades. If anything, their position has arguably become weaker.22 The problem with these 
comparative studies is that through focusing on parliaments alone, they fail to take into 
account broader changes in the respective political systems. Indeed, analyzing the 
development of West European democracies since the Second World War, the volume edited 
by Strøm, Müller and Bergman shows that in many ways parliaments have become better at 
controlling governments – they have reformed their rules of procedure and committee systems 
to facilitate oversight of the government, with MPs also making more active use of various 
control mechanisms such as parliamentary questions.23 However, that study also clearly 
shows that national parliaments are subject to much more external constraints than before, 
with particularly global and European rules and the stronger role of courts impacting on the 
sovereignty of parliaments. 
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Moreover, cabinet duration has increased over the decades, with more stable governments in 
charge of more professional public administrations.24 European democracies have in the past 
decades moved towards a more executive-oriented system, with a powerful prime minister in 
charge of a cabinet, whose ministers have considerable autonomy in their respective policy 
fields. An increasing share of cabinets stays in office for the whole electoral term, with party 
groups of the government parties providing the needed parliamentary support. As King 
pointed out in his seminal contribution, the executive-legislative relationship must not be 
portrayed as one between two separate institutions, but as a more complex phenomenon, with 
significant variation across countries.25 The government-opposition dimension crosscuts the 
institutional divide, and is arguably the more significant of the two. Since government 
survival depends on the confidence of the parliamentary majority, cohesive party groups 
provide the necessary means for providing that support. Instead of the whole parliament as an 
institution criticizing the executive, checking the government takes place largely within 
parties, for example, through weekly meetings between government parties’ parliamentary 
groups and the party leaders, including the ministers.26 In member states with cohesive, 
disciplined parties — such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, and Sweden — the executive and the parliament are often so intertwined that 
measuring their independent influence in decision-making is at best very difficult. 
 
 
Information is a key factor in shaping the relations between the government and the 
parliament. There is no doubt that in all EU member states the government by virtue of its 
sheer size and the position it occupies within the political system enjoys a huge informational 
advantage over the legislature. Parliaments can obviously reduce this information deficit 
through cost-effective procedural reforms. Research has shown that extensive use of 
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committees facilitates stronger government scrutiny. Especially committees with jurisdiction 
paralleling executive departments, small and stable memberships, and amendment rights are 
well equipped to exercise oversight of the cabinet.27 Thus legislatures with strong 
committees, such as the Nordic parliaments, the Italian Camera dei Deputati and German 
Bundestag, are normally ranked as the most powerful in Europe.  
 
 
But, despite such investment in committee work, governments remain firmly in control of the 
parliamentary agenda and the passage of legislation. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in 
policy initiation. To quote Norton: ‘the effect has been to confirm or to shift the onus for 
formulating -- or ‘making’ -- public policy onto government. Whatever the formal status of 
the legislature, the principal measures of public policy emanate from the executive’.28 With 
(arguably) modest influence over domestic legislation, analysts have underlined the 
importance of legislatures contributing to regime legitimacy and stability. Parliaments and 
regular elections provide the MPs and the electorate with a public forum for airing grievances. 
MPs are subject to more intensive lobbying by interest groups than before, and also contacts 
between citizens and their MPs have become more extensive.29 However, public support for 
parliaments seems to be in decline. Strict party discipline, the representation of special 
interests, and the MPs’ alleged pursuit of self-interest attract most criticism from the citizens. 
Moreover, citizens may to an increasing extent feel that national institutions, particularly 
representative bodies, are no longer capable of defending their interests, as real power is seen 
to lie elsewhere: central banks (including ECB), large multinational corporations, 
government, and of course the European Union.30  
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This brief overview of literature has shown that – at least since the 1960s and 1970s – the 
executive branch has dominated decision-making in European systems of parliamentary 
government. European integration undeniably impacts on the work of national legislatures, 
both through transferring authority on a range of issues to the European level and through 
(indirectly) influencing also those policy areas still subject to national competence. But, 
national legislatures were already operating under a multitude of constraints even without any 
effects directly caused by integration or ‘Europe’. Hence the argument about 
deparliamentarization, and the role of European integration in contributing to the decline of 
legislatures, needs to be modified. First, it has been based on an unrealistic conception of 
parliamentary democracy, and has tended to mistakenly presume some kind of a golden era of 
parliamentary government that existed before the EU cast its shadow over national politics. 
The EU it is often argued fails the democracy test. Yet such views frequently rest on entirely 
misleading and unfair assumptions, as Andrew Moravcsik has pointed out.31 Secondly, it is 
wrong to equate lack of active control with no control at all as MPs employ a variety of 
mechanisms to holding their governments accountable. Informal instruments can be no less 
effective for being informal in some political situations. 
 
 
Nonetheless, irrespective of the validity of the deparliamentarization thesis, there is no 
denying that European integration is a major challenge to national parliaments. According to 
the Europeanization literature reviewed in this section, parliaments have been ‘victims’ of 
integration. But, as the next section shows, parliaments throughout the EU have gradually 
become better at playing the European game, exerting more control over their government in 
EU matters and incrementally accruing more influence on both the rules and the substance of 
the legislative game.  
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NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS’ ADAPTATION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
 
Legislatures, like any institutions or purposeful actors, respond to changes in their 
environment. They do this in two ways: first, through reforming their own rules of procedure, 
and second, through shaping the terms of interaction with other institutions. In the case of 
national parliaments’ adaptation to European integration, the former has primarily involved 
the establishment of European Affairs Committees (EACs) – or EU committees – and the 
gradual empowerment of sectoral committees in processing EU matters, while the latter 
covers both amendments to national constitutions and the establishment of various forms of 
European-level interparliamentary cooperation.  
 
 
The adaptation by national parliaments can be divided into three stages, during which the 
legislatures have become more involved in the governance of the Union. The analytical 
framework in Table 1 and in the following discussion draws on the categorization by 
Norton.32 The column ‘individual role’ refers to adaptation within national political systems – 
that is, those changes that have taken place domestically in the legislature-executive 
relationship. The column ‘collective role’ in turn refers to both interparliamentary cooperation 
and to constitutional recognition in the Treaties about the role of national parliaments.    
 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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During the first stage (limited involvement) national parliaments showed little interest in 
European integration. This was mainly explained by the political system of the European 
Community (EC). Following the Luxembourg compromise (1966), Council decision-making 
was based on unanimity, and thus each government could veto initiatives. Secondly, the 
competence of the EC was relatively thin, covering mainly commercial and agricultural 
policies. The Community was thus effectively an intergovernmental organization until the 
mid-1980s, and national legislatures did not generally perceive that their sovereignty was 
under threat. And finally, public opinion in the founding six member states — Benelux 
countries, France, Italy, and West Germany — was supportive of integration, with most 
political parties also in favour of deeper integration. National legislatures thus remained 
marginal and passive actors in the arena of EC governance. 
 
 
The situation began to change in 1973 as Denmark and the UK (and Ireland) entered the 
Community. The membership issue produced a notable cleavage in both countries, with party 
elites and public opinion much more hesitant about integration than in the other member 
states. The parliament had also traditionally occupied a central place in both the Danish and 
British polities. Hence it was no surprise that legislatures in both countries decided to 
establish EACs in order to keep a closer eye on developments in ‘Europe’. Particularly the 
model of scrutiny adopted by the Danish parliament was a major breakthrough – albeit one 
that was viewed with considerable suspicion outside of Denmark as many feared that such 
comprehensive scrutiny might jeopardize decision-making in the Council. In Denmark the 
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EAC of the Folketinget set up a system where Brussels-bound ministers had to appear before 
the committee before the Council meeting to explain the position and bargaining strategy of 
the government and to seek the support of the committee for the proposed course of action.33 
In the UK the House of Commons introduced in 1980 the so-called ‘parliamentary scrutiny 
reserve’, according to which the British ministers should not give their consent to decisions in 
Brussels before the Commons had completed processing of the issue.34  
 
 
The second stage of the adaptation process, responding to the challenge, thus began 
tentatively already in the mid-1970s. However, the real spur to change was the internal market 
project. The Commission launched its White Paper on the single market in 1985, and the SEA 
was signed a year later. From the national parliaments’ point of view, the SEA brought two 
profound changes: the Community’s jurisdiction was extended to new areas, and the 
introduction of QMV in the Council — along with the assent and cooperation procedures 
which strengthened the legislative powers of the EP and the Commission — meant that 
national governments could no longer block Council decisions. The scrutiny and 
implementation of internal market directives also increased the workload of domestic 
legislatures. This was a rather unwelcome reminder of the erosion of national sovereignty, as 
laws that were previously firmly in the jurisdiction of national parliaments were now 
increasingly being decided in Brussels. 
 
 
National MPs recognized the need to keep pace with Community politics. This was mainly 
done by either establishing EACs – the parliaments of Belgium, Greece, Italy (Camera dei 
Deputati), Luxembourg, The Netherlands (Tweede Kamer), Portugal, and Spain all set up 
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EACs between 1985 and 1990 -- or by strengthening the competence of the already existing 
ones (the first EAC had been established by the German Bundesrat in 1957). Integration 
matters were also now more frequently debated on the parliamentary floor, with especially the 
two IGCs on economic and political unions held in 1990-91 receiving expansive attention. 
 
 
The Maastricht Treaty marked a significant change in the process of integration, with the 
name European Union indicating (at least a symbolic) move from primarily economic 
integration to the creation of a supranational political community. Majority voting was 
increased in the Council, the co-decision procedure gave the EP an equal status with the 
Council in certain issue areas, and the Treaty objectives included such ambitious goals as the 
single currency, EU citizenship, and the gradual development of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). These developments did not go unnoticed among Europeans. The 
Maastricht Treaty marked by and large the end of passive or ‘permissive consensus’, as public 
opinion surveys showed the citizens had become increasingly sceptical of integration. 
National parties were also struggling to maintain unity on European matters. With policy 
competence transferred from the national to the European level, and with both the public and 
the parties divided over Europe, the post-Maastricht debate began to focus on the ‘democratic 
deficit’, defined normally as the weak role of directly elected institutions in EU governance, 
and bridging the perceived gap between ‘Brussels’ and EU citizens. 
 
 
National parliaments were seen as one potential solution to correct the deficit – particularly, 
but not exclusively, among those that were against the deepening of integration. Almost all 
national legislatures sought a more active role for themselves, and thus the third stage of the 
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adaptation process (addressing the democratic deficit) began during the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. The ratification process was overshadowed by tightly contested referenda 
in Denmark and France.35 National legislatures were perhaps belatedly realizing the extent to 
which the successful implementation of the Treaty objectives would change Europe’s political 
landscape. Some parliaments therefore made their ratification conditional upon receiving 
more powers vis-à-vis the government in European matters. For example, the French, 
German, and Portuguese constitutions were amended around this time to give the respective 
legislatures a stronger role in national policy formulation on EU legislation. Other national 
legislatures sought to establish practices that would at least guarantee them better access to 
information on EU matters.36 Another important development was the specialized standing 
committees of national parliaments becoming gradually more involved in European questions. 
The delegation of authority from the EU Committees to standing committees was in part a 
recognition of the huge workload of the EACs, but was also motivated by the need to utilize 
the policy expertise of the MPs. However, this sectoral specialization has proceeded slowly 
and at a very uneven pace: while in some parliaments, such as the Finnish Eduskunta and the 
German Bundestag, the role of the specialized committees has by now become 
institutionalized, in most  parliaments specialized committees remain marginal actors in EU 
matters, and certainly less important than the EACs.. 
 
 
In parallel with these national-level developments, the collective role of domestic legislatures 
also received more attention – both in the form of interparliamentary cooperation and in the 
role of national parliaments being recognized in the Treaties. The Maastricht Treaty included 
two Declarations on national parliaments. Declaration no. 13 stated that: 
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The Conference considers that it is important to encourage greater involvement of 
national Parliaments in the activities of the European Union. To this end, the exchange 
of information between the national Parliaments and the European Parliament should be 
stepped up. In this context, the governments of the Member States will ensure, inter 
alia, that national Parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good 
time for information or possible examination. Similarly, the Conference considers that it 
is important for contacts between the national Parliaments and the European Parliament 
to be stepped up, in particular through the granting of appropriate reciprocal facilities 
and regular meetings between members of Parliament interested in the same issues.37
 
Declaration no. 14 tried to breathe life into the ‘Assizes’, the joint conference of the EP and 
national parliaments that had convened in 1990: 
 
The Conference invites the European Parliament and the national Parliaments to meet as 
necessary as a Conference of the Parliaments (or ‘Assizes’) The Conference of the 
Parliaments will be consulted on the main features of the European Union, without 
prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the rights of the national 
Parliaments. The President of the European Council and the President of the 
Commission will report to each session of the Conference of the Parliaments on the 
state of the Union.38
 
 
While Declarations are not legally binding, their inclusion in the Treaty was nevertheless a 
political breakthrough, as this was the first time that national legislatures were recognized in 
the ‘constitution’ of the EC/EU. The Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997) marked another step 
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forward. Attached to the Treaty was a ‘Protocol on the role of the national parliaments in the 
European Union’.39 Unlike Declarations, Protocols are legally binding instructions for the 
relevant individuals and institutions. 
 
 
The Protocol consolidated and strengthened the provisions and language of the Maastricht 
Treaty Declarations. It set an exact time limit which the national parliaments and the EU 
institutions had to respect, and listed which documents the national legislatures had the right 
to receive. These included ;all Commission consultation documents (green and white papers 
and communications)’ and ‘Commission proposals for legislation as defined by the Council in 
accordance with Article 151(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community’. The 
former were to be sent to the parliaments directly from the Commission, whereas legislative 
initiatives were to be ‘made available in good time so that the Government of each Member 
State may ensure that its own national parliament receives them as appropriate.’ The time 
limit was set at six weeks. 
 
 
Regarding the collective role, the important change concerned the replacement of the Assizes 
with the Conference of the European Affairs Committees (COSAC), which met for the first 
time in November 1989 following an initiative from Laurent Fabius, then the President of the 
French Assembleé Nationale. COSAC meets once every six months in the member state 
holding the EU Presidency, bringing together delegations from the national parliaments’ 
EACs and from the EP.40 According to the Protocol COSAC ‘may make any contribution it 
deems appropriate for the attention of the institutions of the European Union’. Third pillar 
matters, fundamental rights, and subsidiarity were mentioned as areas where COSAC could 
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be particularly active. However, ‘contributions made by COSAC shall in no way bind 
national parliaments or prejudge their position’. In hindsight it was not surprising to see the 
Assizes dropped from the Protocol. The Assizes held in Rome in November 1990 had been 
dominated by the EP’s delegation, with several national parliaments feeling that the EP had 
used the Conference to further its own objectives. 
 
 
But, the main qualitative leap occurred at the turn of the millennium. Declaration no. 23 of the 
Treaty of Nice listed four key questions which the next IGC should address, with one of them 
being ‘the role of national parliaments in the European architecture’.41 And the Laeken 
Declaration from December 2001 put down more detailed questions about the contribution of 
national parliaments: ‘Should they be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council 
and the European Parliament? Should they have a role in areas of European action in which 
the European Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of 
competence between Union and Member States, for example through preliminary checking of 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?’42
 
 
The role of national legislatures featured prominently in the debates of the Convention that 
met from February 2002 to July 2003 to draft a constitution for the Union. This was not really 
very surprising, as 56 out of the 105 members of the Convention represented national 
parliaments (alongside 28 representatives of national governments and 16 MEPs) – thus 
giving the national parliaments a stronger role than before, both individually and collectively, 
in shaping the EU’s Treaties. The Convention even established a separate Working Group 
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(WG IV), entitled ‘The role of national parliaments’, for debating the position of domestic 
legislatures. 
 
 
The Constitutional Treaty, signed in October 2004, is the first time that national parliaments 
are mentioned in the actual main text of the constitution – as opposed to Protocols and 
Declarations that are attached to the Treaties. According to Article I-46 (The principle of 
representative democracy):    
 
1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 
2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. 
Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or 
Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically 
accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens. 
3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. 
Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. 
4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness 
and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.43 
 
 
However, the main sections of the Constitutional Treaty dealing with national parliaments are 
still found in Protocols attached to the Treaty: the ‘Protocol on the Role of National 
Parliaments in the European Union’ and the ‘Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality’. The former Protocol is designed to make national 
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legislators better informed about EU decisions, while the latter focuses specifically on 
monitoring the subsidiarity principle.44  
 
 
According to the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union ‘Draft 
European legislative acts sent to the European Parliament and to the Council shall be 
forwarded to national Parliaments. For the purposes of this Protocol, ‘draft European 
legislative acts’ shall mean proposals from the Commission, initiatives from a group of 
Member States, initiatives from the European Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, 
recommendations from the European Central Bank and requests from the European 
Investment Bank for the adoption of a European legislative act’. This is a definite 
improvement upon the Protocol in the Amsterdam Treaty, as the legislative initiatives shall 
now be sent directly to national parliaments by the respective institutions, whereas under the 
present rules (in the Amsterdam Treaty) the ‘Government of each Member State may ensure 
that its own national parliament receives them as appropriate’. National MPs also gain better 
access to non-legislative documents. In addition to the Commission consultation documents 
(green and white papers and communications) that were already mentioned in the Amsterdam 
Treaty’s Protocol, the national parliaments will in the future also receive the Commission’s 
annual legislative programme, the annual reports of the Court of Auditors, ‘as well as any 
other instrument of legislative planning or policy to national Parliaments, at the same time as 
to the European Parliament and the Council.” Moreover, the Protocol states that the “The 
agendas for and the outcome of meetings of the Council, including the minutes of meetings 
where the Council is deliberating on draft European legislative acts, shall be forwarded 
directly to national Parliaments, at the same time as to Member States’ governments’   
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The paragraphs dealing with interparliamentary cooperation basically just confirm the status 
quo. The EP and the national parliaments ‘shall together determine how interparliamentary 
cooperation may be effectively and regularly organized and promoted within the European 
Union’. On COSAC the Protocol states that: 
 
The Conference of European Affairs Committees may submit any contribution it deems 
appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission. That Conference shall in addition promote the exchange of 
information and best practice between Member States' Parliaments and the European 
Parliament, including their special committees. The Conference may also organize 
interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of 
common foreign and security policy and of common security and defence policy. 
Contributions from the Conference shall in no way bind national Parliaments or 
prejudge their positions.45
 
 
The ‘early warning system’ included in the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality can be primarily seen as an instrument designed to increase 
the legitimacy of European integration. However, through assigning national parliaments the 
potential to actually veto or at least obstruct EU legislation, it can also encourage national 
MPs to invest more resources in processing European issues. According to this system a 
national parliament can send the Commission a ‘reasoned opinion’ if it believes that the 
intended legislation violates the principle of subsidiarity. And, if these reasoned opinions 
represent at least one-third of the votes (at least a quarter in the case of Commission proposals 
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or initiatives emanating from a group of member states under the provisions of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation) allocated to national parliaments, the 
Commission must reconsider its draft legislation. The Commission may then decide whether 
to maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal.46
 
 
This overview of developments clearly shows that national parliaments have gradually 
improved their position – both individually in the context of their own political systems, and 
collectively, through interparliamentary cooperation and through gaining recognition in the 
EU’s constitution. National parliaments have responded quite logically to the empowerment 
of the EU: they all have established an EAC for coordinating parliamentary work in European 
matters, specialized committees are starting to play a bigger role in processing EU issues, and 
in general MPs pay more attention to EU politics. This is only natural, as the influence of 
European integration is basically felt in policy areas (and hence in all parliamentary 
committees). National parliaments have proven that they are capable of institutional 
adaptation and learning, with each parliament choosing its own method of scrutiny depending 
on the parliamentary traditions of the country and on what the parliament wants to achieve.47 
Whether this amounts to effective control is another matter, but at the very least national 
parliaments should no longer be simply labeled as losers or victims of integration. The next 
section explains how national parliaments get involved in EU affairs.    
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CONTROLLING THE GOVERNMENT IN EU MATTERS 
 
 
National parliaments have gradually attained quite extensive duties and rights in the EU’s 
political system. Their main function in the EU’s policy process is to control their executives, 
that is the governments that represent member states in the Council and the European 
Council. The ability of a legislature to control the government in European affairs depends on 
a variety of factors that include the constitutional rules and established ‘ways of doing things’ 
of the country, and party-political factors such as the composition of the governments and the 
cohesion of political parties.48 This function brings national parliaments regularly into the 
game, as the Council holds meetings during most weeks of the year (excluding EU holidays), 
and the European Council meets several times every year. National parliaments are also 
responsible for adopting amendments to the EU’s ‘constitution’ according to respective 
national constitutional regulations. Finally, national parliaments are involved, in some 
member states more than others, in the implementation of EU directives when this requires 
enactment of new domestic legislation.49
 
 
As parliamentary scrutiny of EU matters is largely based on controlling the government in 
individual pieces of supranational EU legislation, it is worth describing briefly how the 
system works at the national level. The reader should bear in mind that the following 
description is a simplification of how things work and that there are significant differences 
between the individual parliaments (Figure 1).50
 
FIGURE 1 
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As mentioned above, all national legislatures have established EACs, whose task is to 
coordinate parliamentary scrutiny of European matters and to monitor government 
representatives in the Council. MEPs are represented in the EACs of the parliaments of 
Belgium (joint committee of the two chambers), Germany (Bundestag), Greece, Ireland (joint 
committee of the two chambers), and Malta).51 The process begins with the government 
submitting to the parliament Commission’s legislative proposals that fall within the 
competence of the legislatures. The government informs the parliament of its stand, and the 
legislature takes note of the cabinet’s position. As the overwhelming majority of EU 
legislation is in reality already decided in the Council’s working groups and in the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), parliaments that only get involved in the process 
just before the relevant Council meeting have quite marginal possibilities to influence the 
decisions. It is also essential that the parliament is kept up-to-date, as the Council and the EP, 
particularly in legislation falling under the co-decision procedure, often quite significantly 
amend the initiatives. 
 
 
The extent to which legislatures delegate European matters downward to specialized 
committees varies between countries. In most member states the specialized committees 
remain sidelined, either because EU matters are centralized to the EAC or because the 
committees themselves are not interested in processing European matters.52 The same applies 
to plenaries, debates in the actual chamber of the parliament. The low involvement of 
plenaries means that the debating function of the parliament has remained marginal in 
European matters. One explanation for the lack of plenary debates is that political parties – 
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that tend to be divided over integration and are more pro-integrationist than their electorates – 
have an electoral incentive in downplaying EU issues. 
 
 
Before the Council meeting the EACs receive the agendas of the meetings, in most countries 
together with government memoranda that explain the impact of the proposed law both 
domestically and at the European level. The responsible minister then appears, if requested, in 
person before the committee. The MPs have the opportunity to put questions to the minister, 
following which the EAC decides if there is a majority in favour or against the government 
position. There is notable variation in the frequency of committee meetings, with most EACs 
meeting on a weekly basis when the parliament is in session. Considering the work schedule 
of the Council, it is reasonable to assume that the more often the EACs meet, the better 
positioned they are to control ministers. After the Council meeting the minister reports back 
to the EAC, appearing in person if so required to give an account of the meeting. The same 
procedure applies more or less to monitoring European Council meetings and IGCs. 
 
 
The ability to ‘mandate’ the ministers through setting the bargaining range or even issuing 
explicit voting instructions is usually emphasized in the literature. This results particularly 
from the Danish system, where the EAC of the Folketinget is famous for its ability to 
constrain ministers through issuing explicit voting instructions.53 The EACs of the Austrian 
Nationalrat and the Danish Folketinget have the right to issue binding voting instructions to 
government representatives. The mandating power of the Austrian parliament is included in 
the constitution, whereas the practice in Denmark is so institutionalized that it is almost 
constitutional in character. The Dutch Tweede Kamer has similar powers in Justice and Home 
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Affairs matters as does the German Bundesrat where a proposal requires approval pursuant to 
domestic law or in instances where the Länder have jurisdiction. However, it must be 
emphasized that there is huge variation between the parliaments. In most countries the ability 
to mandate ministers is either completely lacking, or it is rarely exercised. In the majority of 
the member states the government merely sends information to the EAC, with a minister, or a 
civil servant from a ministry occasionally appearing before the committee, usually when more 
important matters are on the agenda. 
 
 
However, this emphasis on mandating is not entirely unproblematic. After all, the government 
depends on the support of the legislature (which can throw the government out of office) even 
without any constitutional powers to mandate the ministers. Therefore governments can be 
expected to incorporate the preferences of the MPs into their negotiating positions even 
without any explicit mandating. This applies particularly to issues that require the approval of 
domestic legislatures, such as IGCs leading to amendments of the EU’s constitution.54 
Secondly, while comprehensive and active scrutiny may well be a good strategy, issuing 
voting instructions may well work against successful defence of national interests. After all, 
should the EAC tie the hands of the government before the negotiations, this reduced ability 
of the government to build compromises might result in worse outcomes than what might be 
achieved with a more flexible bargaining strategy. 55Despite these reservations, regular 
hearings with the ministers (including the possibility of issuing voting instructions) enable the 
parliament to engage in a wider consultation and negotiation process with the government 
than might otherwise be the case. Having explained the ‘standard model’ of parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU affairs, the final section introduces the research questions that guide the rest of 
the book. 
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OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
 
 
The book is divided into three sections. Part one examines the main macro issues relating to 
national parliamentary oversight of EU affairs. As well as outlining some of the key concepts 
in the literature it also addresses issues related to European interparliamentary cooperation, 
the relationship between individual and collective action which national parliaments engage 
in across the broad spectrum of EU issues, and the position of national parliaments within the 
Convention process and the Constitutional Treaty which followed. 
 
 
In chapter 2 Muiris MacCarthaigh introduces key concepts dealing with political 
accountability and legitimacy which broadly inform the approach of the book to the subject 
area. He considers why accountability, and in particular, parliamentary accountability, is so 
crucial to the democratic process in Europe. He posits accountability as a contested but 
nevertheless central referent in contemporary social science and explores how parliaments 
discharge their accountability functions. Introducing EU decision-making into the narrative he 
also considers the range of current challenges which face national parliaments in their efforts 
to protect the legitimacy of the political systems which they are embedded in. In the context 
of new and questionable accountability relationships emerging across the inter-connected 
arenas of governance in Europe, concerns proliferate about the contemporary scope and 
nature of parliamentary accountability. MacCarthaigh also demonstrates that the ability of 
parliaments to effectively control their executive bodies will depend crucially on both the 
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domestic political culture and the particular institutional matrix employed within the 
legislative arena. And if, as this chapter argues, the EU and Europeanization do indeed erode 
the influence of national parliaments within local political systems, it is also clear that 
national parliaments have to some extent benefited from the new focus on accountability and 
legitimacy as attention has turned toward achieving a suitable domestic ‘fit’ between that 
which is (in legislative terms) purely local and that which is supranational and European. 
 
In chapter 3 Christina Bengston assesses the nature of contemporary inter-parliamentary 
cooperation in Europe. She identifies a progressive trajectory where national parliaments have 
become much more proactive in pushing inter-parliamentary cooperation in the directions 
they desire. The chapter argues that national parliaments, whilst having a lot in common with 
the European Parliament, national parliaments also pursue agendas which differ significantly 
from the EP. Cooperation in and through COSAC has gradually helped national parliaments 
to carve out a space for themselves in the EU decision-making arena. Importantly the work of 
COSAC has helped link the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’ in national policy-making as EU 
issues are increasingly classified as both.  
 
In chapter 4 Philipp Kiiver considers the role played by national parliaments within the EU 
process under the rubrics of both individual and collective activities. As individual entities 
national parliaments, acting in a domestic context, can be effective in calling their 
governments to account for both their behaviour in the EU Council and, more broadly, the 
policies adopted in an individual state as a result of membership of the EU. But what may 
seem like purely domestic oversight also has a potential collective impact at EU level in that a 
parliament that ties the hands of its minister in EU negotiations may as a result impede the 
search for a EU-wide consensus on that issue. Obviously, the greater number of parliaments 
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that act in such a way the greater the inefficiencies in the collective EU decision-making 
process. Similarly, as in the case of the French Parliament’s rejection of the EDC in 1954, the 
decision of an individual parliament to reject an EU constitutional template may have a 
decisive impact on events at the collective level.56 And although national parliaments can 
increasingly be viewed as a collective in an EU context the polycentric character of EU 
governance still does not allow for a genuinely collective role for national parliaments: each 
parliament still engages primarily with local issues in a local political context. Allowing for 
this Kiiver argues that recently developed domestic instruments of control such as formal 
legal provisions for mandating of government ministers and sharper scrutiny in committees 
means that the dualist role of national parliaments is collapsing. At the very least the domestic 
oversight of EU affairs can have significant repercussions at EU level. 
 
In his contribution to part one of the book (chapter 5) Tapio Raunio considers the implications 
of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty for national parliaments, focusing specifically on 
parliamentary access to information and on the process of monitoring compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle. He argues that while the Constitutional Treaty will strengthen the 
position of national parliaments in the EU policy process, this empowerment does not 
constitute a significant departure from present arrangements. The positive developments in 
respect of greater parliamentary control evident since the Maastricht Treaty are enhanced 
again but in the end it is up to national MPs themselves to decide how and to what extent they 
want to engage with EU affairs. One positive change which the Constitutional Treaty brings is 
in access to information. National MPs shall receive more documents from the European 
level, and these documents will be sent directly to parliaments at the same time as to national 
governments. The so-called ‘early warning system’ established for monitoring compliance 
with the subsidiarity principle should mean that national parliaments pay more attention to 
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EU matters across the board. But, as Raunio argues, this will depend on a much more 
substantive investment of time and resources by national parliamentarians. 
 
 
Part two of the volume consists of country studies drawn from the ‘old’ EU member states. 
The first of these by Hans Hegeland analyzes the mechanisms employed by the Nordic 
parliaments – those of Denmark, Finland and Sweden – in exercising oversight of EU affairs 
in their countries. Outlining the two ideal types of domestic and foreign policy decision-
making processes he argues that EU matters are peculiar in terms of traditional political 
science thinking. Increasingly it is extremely difficult to separate that what is purely 
‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’, as EU activity encroaches into more and more areas of public 
policy. Hegeland’s chapter then compares and contrasts the three different models and argues 
that each parliament deals with the EU neither as domestic policy or foreign policy. Rather he 
argues the Nordic systems constitute a new kind of model where parliaments have a weaker 
role in EU policy than they carry out in domestic policy but a significantly stronger role than 
traditionally was the case in foreign policy. Hegeland also demonstrates that the Danish and 
Swedish legislatures have evaluated the effectiveness of their scrutiny systems, and both the 
Swedish Riksdag and the Danish Folketing are attempting to make specialized committees 
more involved in the processing of EU issues. Thus the Nordic parliaments seem to stand out 
from most others within the EU as the most proactive and engaged in EU decision-making. 
 
 
A clear contrast to the Nordic models is evident in the discussion of Southern European 
parliaments and their approach to EU issues. In his analysis of the parliaments of the four 
Mediterranean EU countries, usually categorized as laggards in terms of their engagement in 
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European affairs, José Magone examines how the Italian and Portuguese legislatures have, 
since the mid-1990s, invested considerably more resources in EU matters. The Spanish and 
Greek parliaments remain, however, very weak vis-à-vis their governments in European 
matters, with MPs in these two countries in general showing relatively little interest in such 
questions. 
 
 
In her substantial contribution Carina Sprungk assesses the roles played by the French 
Assemblée Nationale and the German Bundestag in EU affairs. Despite the different positions 
occupied by each parliament within their national political system, Sprungk finds striking 
similarities in how they now discharge their EU-related functions. Both parliaments enjoy the 
right to comprehensive information on EU policy-making; in both cases information is 
processed at a relatively early stage in the policy cycle; and both parliaments have the right to 
state an opinion on legislative proposals in advance of EU Council meetings. The 
parliamentary committees in each country also perform similar functions such as the 
examination of documents and enjoy similar resources. One key contrast, however, is that the 
Bundestag enjoys constitutionally enshrined rights to involvement while the Assemblée 
Nationale commands an inferior legal position. Paradoxically, however, the domestically 
powerful Bundestag seems to be more reluctant than the relatively weak Asemblée Nationale 
when it comes to exercising its powers. Whilst this might be put down to the prevailing 
‘permissive consensus’ concerning EU affairs within the Bundestag (and throughout Germany 
more generally) there are other complex phenomena to be considered such as how 
information is parlayed to MPs and domestic parliamentary rules of procedure. Sprungk 
demonstrates that in both parliaments a relatively large number of individual MPs as well as 
the specialized committees and dedicated European Affairs committees are active participants 
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in the legislature’s engagement with EU policy areas. Interestingly parliamentary involvement 
tends toward cooperation with the executive rather than conflict. Thus one can identify a 
definite trend toward convergence of both parliaments in dealing with the EU in legislative 
and broader political terms. 
 
 
In chapter 9 Adam Cygan focuses on the United Kingdom and the ‘dualist’ model of scrutiny 
employed by the Houses of Parliament. In examining how both the Lords and the Commons 
have sought to retain control over EU affairs Cygan considers the political, legal, and 
constitutional context in which the scrutiny process has evolved over the lifetime of UK 
membership of the EU. The principal vehicle for parliamentary scrutiny –the ‘Scrutiny 
reserve’ seeks to maximize the executive’s accountability to parliament in EU affairs and is 
intended primarily to reassure sceptical MPs that the views of the UK Parliament do matter 
and are relevant to EU decision-making. In chapter 10 Patricia Conlan examines the evolution 
of parliamentary scrutiny in Ireland, focusing on current arrangements and in particular, on 
the Irish Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Scrutiny. The Irish case represents (at least on 
paper) an especially striking example of enhancement of the powers of national parliaments in 
recent years. This empowerment evolved in response to the concerns about the legitimacy of 
the EU decision-making process which emerged with the defeat of the Nice Treaty in the June 
2001 referendum. Conlan outlines how the system of scrutiny has been strengthened, 
demonstrating that there is greater information available, how the committee system has been 
enhanced, and overall the greater transparency evident within the system. However, she 
demonstrates equally that the system still leaves a lot to be desired: the enhanced procedures 
put in place post Nice and the flexible approach to their operation suggest great potential for 
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effective parliamentary control. But (as in other jurisdictions) parliamentarians are hampered 
by lack of resources and informational shortcomings. 
 
 
Part three of the book is devoted to analysis of the parliaments from the ‘new’ member states, 
that is, those states, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which joined the EU in 
2004. In chapter 11 Adam Łazowski outlines the role played by the Polish parliament - the 
Sejm - in EU decision-making. Membership of the EU has meant a substantial re-orientation 
of executive-legislature relations in Poland as in other states in CEE. Under the rubric of the 
pre accession process the Sejm played a pivotal role in the transposition of the EU’s legal 
rulebook – the acquis communautaire – into the domestic legal order. Łazowski demonstrates 
that the deparliamentarization thesis applies even more directly to those states that recently 
acceded to the EU than to the older member states. In Poland most of the legal approximation 
bills originated in and with the executive; this severely limited the role of the legislature, 
especially in a context where there was a tight timeframe for negotiation and a rather frenzied 
period of legislative activity. But with new rules and procedures introduced shortly before 
accession there are potential instruments available to Polish parliamentarians to exercise a 
more robust degree of control over executive action. In her contribution on the Hungarian 
Parliament Enikő Győri traces the development of EU affairs in the country and how the 
Hungarian Parliament adopted a model based on existing best practice in the older member 
states. As was the case in the Polish pre-accession framework the Hungarian parliament 
continually lost ground to the government as the accession negotiations proceeded. Partly this 
arose for the same reasons as in Poland but crucially also because no specific rules governing 
the executive-legislative division of labour emerged until after accession. Thus the Hungarian 
Parliament’s instrument for exercising scrutiny has only been in place since September 2004. 
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Although nominally in a strong position the Committee on European Affairs is hampered by 
being allowed only late involvement in the decision-making process, the inaccessibility of 
documentation, and the low levels of knowledge and activity of MPs. And although as in 
other CEE states Hungary’s specialized committees offer real potential for parliamentary 
empowerment Győri sums up by arguing that the Hungarian Parliament resembles more a 
‘mute witness’ than a ‘true controller’ of EU affairs in a domestic political context. 
 
Chapter 13 by Primož Vehar analyzes the Slovenian Parliament and its role in EU affairs 
prior to and after accession. He demonstrates how the Finnish model was largely adopted in 
Slovenia as the accession process developed and the parliament became more and more 
preoccupied with EU issues. The introduction of a European Affairs Committee along with 
the involvement of horizontal standing or specialized committees means that the Slovenian 
system is potentially an important player in the legislative process. Some of the existing 
shortcomings which Vehar attributes mainly to the difficulties new member states can expect 
naturally to experience are likely to diminish over time leaving Slovenia with an effective 
system of oversight and control. The final country study in the volume by Pavlina Stoykova 
examines the Bulgarian adaptation to European integration in advance of accession and 
demonstrates how deparliamentarization has occurred in practice as Europeanization has 
proceeded apace. Bulgaria’s case is particularly interesting because it demonstrates that in the 
asymmetrical power context of an accession process the EU acts as a regime maker and the 
candidate state as a passive regime-taker. However, within that context it is clear that the clear 
winner in the domestic sense has been the executive which from an early stage took charge of 
preparations for membership and gained more and more leverage over the parliament as EU 
demands were ratcheted up and the transposition process became the main priority of political 
activity. The executive’s empowerment thus over time degraded the parliament’s formal 
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competences within domestic decision-making and thus allowed the government to avoid 
critical and substantive scrutiny of its EU-related activities. And whereas the short term 
requirement to speed up the process of domestic legal approximation with EU laws may have 
been deemed acceptable for Bulgaria it seems clear that the longer term legitimacy of the EU 
policy-making process will require a more balanced relationship between the Bulgarian 
government and parliament. In the sense that the volume’s broad themes of accountability, 
legitimacy, deparliamentarization and Europeanization can all be demonstrated in the 
Bulgarian example it seems a good place to conclude this introduction to the book and 
proceed to part one. 
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